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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 56 MAY 1958 No. 7 
MODIFICATION OF CONSENT DECREES: A PROPOSAL 
TO THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 
Victor H. Kramer* 
THE genius of the Sherman Act has been said to lie in its gen-erality and adaptability.1 Thus the act has been successfully 
applied for almost three-quarters of a century to an economy that 
has been more dynamic than during any comparable period in 
history. 
In 1912, twenty-two years after passage of the act, consent de-
crees began to be frequently used as a means of settling, without 
trial, civil antitrust suits brought by the govemment.2 Their use 
became even more popular as a result of the passage in 1914 of 
section 5 of the Clayton Act.3 It permitted private plaintiffs seek-
ing triple damages for alleged antitrust injuries to use final judg-
•Member of the District of Columbia and Ohio bars; formerly Chief, General Litiga-
tion Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.-Ed. · 
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §1. See Appalachian Coals, 
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 at 359 (1933). 
2 The first consent decree entered in a civil Sherman Act case instituted by the United 
States was that in United States v. Otis Elevator Co. on June 1, 1906. See CCH, THE 
FEDERAL ANTITRusr LAws, p. 75, #30 (1952). Until 1912, only two other consent decrees 
were entered: United States v. American Seating Co. in 1907 (id. at 78, #45) and United 
States v. Southern Wholesale Grocers' Assn. (id. at 84, #72). In 1912, four consent decrees 
were entered: United States v. Standard Wood Co. (id. at 90, #94); United States v. 
Pacific Coast Plumbing Supply Assn. (id. at 93, #104); United States v. Aluminum Co. 
of America (id at 96, #116); and United States v. Central-West Publishing Co. (id. at 97, 
#119). In 1913, six consent decrees were entered-five of them in the final month of the 
Taft Administration: United States v. Master Horseshoers' Nat. Protective Assn. (id. at 
98, #123); United States v. Philadelphia Jobbing Confectioners' Assn. (id. at 98, #124); 
United States v. K.rentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co. (id. at 99, #129); United States v. 
Burroughs Adding Machine Co. (id. at 101, #138); United States v. New Departure Mfg. 
Co. (id. at 102, #141). 
3 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §16. 
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ments in antitrust cases instituted by the government as "prima 
facie evidence . . . as to all matters respecting which said judg-
ment of decree would be an estoppel as between the parties there-
to." But the section contained a proviso that it should "not ap-
ply to consent· judgments or decrees entered before any testi-
mony has been taken." The effect of this proviso was to give de-
fendants in antitrust cases a real incentive to compose their dif-
ficulties with the government. 
There have been about 410 civil cases filed by the United 
States under the Sherman Act terminated by the filing of consent 
judgments and about one-fourth of these judgments have been 
on the books for more than a quarter of a century.4 The injunc-
tive provisions in these judgments apply in perpetuity unless 
expressly limited by their terms to some specific period. Conse-
quently, unless the defendants have died or gone out of business, 
leaving no successor, almost all of these judgments are still in 
effect.5 These decrees relate to products as diverse as quinine 
and peanuts.6 They apply to businesses as large as General Motors 
Corporation and as small as the members of the Library Binding 
Institute in New York City.7 Their provisions are frequently 
minute, particularized and carefully tailored to outlaw the spe-
cific anti-competitive practices engaged in by the defendants at 
the time when the decrees were entered. Some of them outlaw ac-
tivities that do not remotely violate the antitrust laws.8 The pro-
hibitions were deemed necessary when the judgment was entered 
4 The number entered from 1890 through 1956 was obtained from a count of the 
cases listed in CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (1952) and (1952-1956 Supp.). The 
number entered in 1957 (22) was obtained directly from the Antitrust Division. When 
separate consent decrees were entered against more than one defendant in a single case, 
they are nevertheless counted as one decree. And see note 5 infra. 
5 A very few consent decrees, however, have been terminated. For example, the consent 
decree entered in 1929 in United States v. General Outdoor Advertising Co. [CCH, THE 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, p. 152, #346 (1952)) was terminated after entry of the consent 
decree against the same defendant in 1955 [id., 1952-1956 Supp., p. 54, #1058]. Similarly, 
Article IX of the consent judgment in United States v. Textile Refinishers Assn., Inc., 
(CCH TRADE CAS. 1955, 1J68,126) terminated an earlier consent decree against the same 
defendant. See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, p. 172, #414 (1952). A consent judg-
ment in United States v. Gamewell Co. (id. at 346, #874) has been suspended for a 
three-year period (unreported). 
6 United States v. Amsterdamsche Chininefabriek (quinine), CCH, THE FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAWS, p. 150, #337 (1952); United States v. Nat. Peanut Cleaners &: Shellers 
Assn., id. at 140, #294. 
7 United States v. General Motors Corp., CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUst LAws, p. 31, 
#566 (1952-1956 Supp.); United States v. Library Binding Institute, id. at 59, #1081. 
s E.g., see discussion of the Swift and Harvester decrees, at notes 14 and 34 infra. 
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to dissipate the effects of defendant's unlawful conduct or to in-
sure against its renewal or continuation. 
All antitrust consent decrees-at least all those entered in the 
past twenty years-contain a so-called retention-of-jurisdiction 
provision, along the following lines: 
Jurisdiction is retained for the purpose of enabling any 
of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court . 
at any time for such further orders and directions as may be 
necessary or appropriate for the construction or carrying out 
of this Final Judgment, for the modification or termination 
of any of the provisions herein and for the enforcement of 
compliance therewith and punishment of violations therof. 
This provision, while it is frequently cited by courts as the 
source of their power to modify or terminate judgments,° is prob-
ably surplusage. The general rule appears to be that courts have 
inherent power to modify and enforce their judgments.10 More-
over, they have the power to terminate them, 11 although in recent 
years the Antitrust Division has attempted to eliminate the phrase 
"or ttrmination" in the retention-of-jurisdiction provision. 
The standard to be applied in determining whether a defend-
ant should be "relieved" from a final judgment is formulated in 
clause (5) of rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
as amended in 1948.12 That clause permits a court on motion to 
"relieve a party or his legal representative" from any final judg-
ment if it "is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application." It appears that amended rule 60(b) 
applies to judgments entered before, as well as after 1948, "unless 
it 'would work injustice' so to apply the rule."13 
The generality of rule 60(b)(5) offers little guidance in de-
termining the circumstances under which an antitrust consent 
decree may be modified. The Department of Justice has taken the 
position that the tests for modifying a consent judgment, at least 
9 See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 at 463-464 
(1957); Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 at 562 (1942). 
10 See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 at 114 (1932), and United States v. 
California Co-Operative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 (1929). 
11 See Tobin v. Alma Mills, (4th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 133. 
12 28 U.S.C. (1952) §723(c). We are not here concerned with relief from judgments 
entered by mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, fraud, misrepresentation or 
on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Rule 60(b) provides that relief sought on 
these grounds must be requested not more than a year after the entry of the judgment. 
13 See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 at 609 (1949). 
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on the petition of a defendant, are different from those to be ap-
plied in cases involving litigated judgments.14 There is no un-
equivocal authority to support the· department's position. The 
leading case is United States v. Swift & Co.15 It grew out of an 
antitrust consent decree entered into by the government in Feb-
ruary 1920 with the then five largest meat packers.16 Among other 
things the decree prevented the defendants from selling or dis-
tributing groceries and other non-meat products or from operat-
ing retail meat stores.17 A few years later the operation of the de-
cree was suspended.18 In 1928, the Supreme Court finally held 
the consent decree valid and enforceable.19 In· 1930, Swift and 
Armour filed petitions to modify the consent decree by eliminat-
ing the injunctions against their entry into the grocery business 
and in other significant respects. The trial court granted the pe-
titions for modification so as to permit sales of groceries at whole-
sale but denied the prayers for permission to enter the retail 
food business.20 The United States appealed to the Supreme 
Court, which reversed in an opinion by Justice Cardozo. Al-
though the decision was by only four justices with two dissenting 
and three not participating, it has acquired great authority with 
the passing of years, having been cited in well over a hundred 
judicial opinions. 
Cardozo's discussion of the law on modification of equity de-
crees commenced with the point that the same tests apply to liti-
gated judgments as to those entered by consent of the parties. 
He said: 
"The result is all one whether the decree has been entered 
after litigation or by consent. American Press Assn. v. United 
States, 245 Fed. 91. In either event, a court does not abdicate 
its power to revoke or modify its mandate if satisfied that 
what it has been doing has been turned through changing 
circumstances into an instrument of wrong. We reject the 
argument . . . that a decree entered upon consent is to be 
treated as a contract and not as a judicial act."21 
14See Brief for the United States in support of Motion for Summary Judgment in 
United States v. Swift & Co., filed Sept. 9, 1957, pp. 5-6. See text at note 44 infra. 
15 286 U.S. 106 (1932). 
16 See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUsr LAWS, p. 118, #211 (1952). 
17 See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 at 328-329 (1928). 
18 See United States v. California Co-Operative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 at 555 (1929). 
10 Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928). 
20See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 at 113-114 (1932). 
21 Id. at 114-115. 
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Five pages later he seems to reverse himself and hold that a 
much stricter test is to be applied to petitions to modify consent 
decrees. He said: 
"Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked 
by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change 
what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of 
all concerned." 
There are practical problems facing the court and the parties 
when a consent decree is sought to be modified that are not pres-
ent when modification is sought of a judgment after trial. In con-
sent decrees there is no record available to which the court may 
turn for guidance on market structure, competitive conditions 
and industry practices. There is no judicial opinion available to 
explain the reasons why any particular provision of the decree 
was adopted. There are no findings of fact to serve as a founda-
tion for the relief granted. It is, therefore, necessary for a court, 
in passing upon a motion to modify or vacate an antitrust consent 
judgment, to try some or all of the very issues the trial of which 
was obviated by the entry of the decree on consent. This consid-
eration was emphasized by Justice Cardozo in the closing sen-
tence of his opinion: "What was then solemnly adjudged as a 
final composition of an historic litigation will not lightly be un-
done at the suit of the offenders, and the composition held for 
nothing."22 
The few opinions in the decided cases23 suggest the following 
22 Id. at 120. 
23 The following is a list of all reported judicial opinions found by the writer, passing 
on petitions or motions by defendants to modify or vacate final decrees or judgments in 
cases brought by the United States under the Sherman Act: 
Applications granted 
1. United States v. E. I. du Pont De Nemours &: Co., (D.C. Del. 1921) 273 F. 869 
(litigated decree). 
2. American Press Assn. v. United States, (7th Cir. 1917) 245 F. 91 (consent decree). 
3. United States v. International Salt Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1948) CCH 1948-1949 TRADE 
CAS., 1[62,270 (litigated judgment) (granted in part and denied in part). 
4. United States v. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 356 
(litigated judgment). 
Applications denied 
1. United States v. Discher, (S.D. N.Y. 1919) 255 F. 719 (consent decree). 
2. United States v. New England Fish Exchange, (D.C. Mass. 1923) 292 F. 511 (litigated 
decree). 
3. United States v. Swift &: Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932) (consent decree). 
4. United States v. Tanner Products Co., (N.D. Ill. 1933) CCH TRADE REG. CT. DEC. 
Supp. 1932-1939, 1[55,037 (consent decree). 
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generalization: except where the government consents, a provi-
sion in a judgment in an antitrust case filed by the United States 
imposing continuing injunctions will be terminated by the court 
only upon a showing by the defendant that (1) the conditions giv-
ing rise to the injunction have substantially changed; (2) it is 
clear that the injunction is no longer necessary to obtain defend-
ant's obedience to law; and (3) the injunction constitutes a serious 
handicap to the defendant. While it may be more difficult for a 
defendant to obtain a modification of a consent decree than of 
one entered after trial, the circumstances under which modifica-
tion will be granted should remain the same in both situations. 
But a defendant may properly be required to sustain a heavier 
burden of proof in establishing that the circumstances justifying 
modification in fact are present. 
Thus far we have been considering cases where a defendant 
seeks to modify or vacate· an antitrust judgment. What is the situ-
ation when the shoe is on the other foot and the government is 
the petitioner? Only once has the United States been successful 
in obtaining modification of an antitrust judgment over defend-
5. United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., (D.C. Del. 1945) 61 F. Supp. 656 (litigated 
judgment). See also (D.C. Del. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 297. 
6. United States v. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1951) CCH 1950-1951 
TRADE CAs. ff62,795 (litigated judgment). 
7. United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., (W.D. N.Y. 1954) CCH 1954 TRADE 
CAS. ffff67,848 and 67,902 (litigated judgment). See also (W.D. N.Y. 1952) CCH 1952-1953 
TRADE CAs. ff67,237. 
8. United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., (E.D. Mich. 1954) 125 F. Supp. 710 (litigated 
judgment). 
See also Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178 at 184 (1948); Milk Wagon Drivers 
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 at 298 (1941); Franke v. Wiltschek, (2d Cir. 
1953) 209 F. (2d) 493 at 498, n. 3; Western Union Tel. Co. v. International Brotherhood, 
(7th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 955; Bigelow v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., (7th Cir. 
1950) 183 F. (2d) 60 at 62; Bigelow v. Balaban &: Katz Corp., (7th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 
794 at 797; Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., (10th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 788. 
For decisions in cases involving analogous issues under cease and desist orders issued 
by the Federal Trade Commission, see Indiana Quartered Oak Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1932) 
58 F. (2d) 182; Century Metalcraft Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 443; Ameri-
can Chain &: Cable Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 909. 
The following two cases each involved petitions to terminate injunctions against 
violating the Fair Labor Standards Act [52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §201]: Tobin 
v. Alma Mills, (W.D. S.C. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 728, revd. (4th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 133 
(consent decree entered in 1940 dissolved on ground that defendant "has observed the 
provisions of the statute in good faith over a period of ten years and there is no present 
reason to apprehend violation by him" and (at 136) "injunction was hampering the owners 
of the company in disposing of their stock"); Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., (E.D. Wis. 
1956) 142 F. Supp. 202, affd. (7th Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 712 (motion to vacate injunction 
entered in 1944 denied where 1based on contention that judgment was inequitable under 
rule 60(b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. and not on the basis of changed conditions). 
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ant's opposition: Chrysler Corporation v. United St(Ztes.24 Even 
then, only four justices voted in favor of upholding the modi-
fication allowed by the district court.25 Chrysler, in 1938, had 
consented to a decree which contained an injunction prohibiting 
it from affiliating with an automobile finance company. The de-
cree contained a proviso that this injunction would be lifted if 
by January 1, 1941 a final order had not been obtained requiring 
General Motors to divest itself of its wholly-owned automobile 
finance company. The specified date arrived and no such order 
had been obtained. The government moved for and obtained 
modification of the decree extending the date for one year.26 An-
other year passed and no relief had been obtained against Gen-
eral Motors. Again the government applied for and obtained 
from the district court a second one-year extension. Chrysler 
appealed to the Supreme Court. Justice Black, for the Court, 
stated that "the test to be applied" is "whether the change served 
to effectuate or to thwart the basic purpose of the original con-
sent decree."27 He then proceeded to affirm the district court's 
findings that the government had proceeded diligently in its suit 
against General Motors, and that the requested modification 
would not impose a serious burden on Chrysler. The majority 
emphasized that Chrysler had made no showing that the modi-
fication would place it at a competitive disadvantage. 
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, answered this conclusion, stat-
ing, "The burden obviously rested upon the Government to show 
good cause for disregarding an express provision in a carefully 
framed decree .... "28 
Six years later, the Court had before it Ford's appeal from 
an extension by the district court of a similar ban against affilia-
tion with a finance company in a similar decree entered against 
it. Again the decision of the Court was by four justices. This 
time Justice Frankfurter was in the majority and wrote the 
Court's opinion.29 The Court held that those circumstances in 
24 316 U.S. 556 (1942). 
25 Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black, Douglas and Byrnes. Justices Roberts, 
Murphy and Jackson took no part, and Justices Frankfurter and Reed dissented. 
26 See Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 at 560 (1942). Chrysler had ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court from the first modification but the appeal was dismissed 
for want of a quorum of qualified justices [314 U.S. 583 (1941), rehearing den. 314 U.S. 
716 (1942)). 
27 Id. at 562. 
28 Id. at 570. 
29 Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948). Justices Frankfurter and 
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the Chrysler case which "were found extenuating on behalf of 
the Government two years after the entry of the decree are hard-
ly compelling ten years afterward,"30 and reversed the district 
court's judgment modifying the decree. 
Justice Black, in sharp dissent, charged that the Court treated 
the consent decree "as though it were a contract between private 
persons for purchase of an automobile."31 He then cited the 
Swift case as authority for the proposition that "a consent decree 
is not a contract, but a judicial act." 
The fact is that a consent decree has many elements of a con-
tract. Perhaps a more accurate description would be that it is a 
contract approved by a court. In an opinion handed down but 
three months after the Supreme Court decision in the Chrysler 
case, Judge Maris held that consent decrees are "based" on agree-
ments "binding upon the government."32 In the RCA case the gov-
ernment had moved to dismiss the complaint and vacate the 
consent decree entered ten years earlier on the ground that, in 
the opinion of the Department of Justice, the decree no longer 
promoted the public interest. In effect, it sought another chance 
to obtain more effective relief in a new proceeding. Judge Maris, 
in denying the government motion, stated: 
"Since these consent decrees are based upon an agreement 
made by the Attorney General which is binding upon the 
Government the defendants are entitled to set them up as 
a bar to any attempt by the Government to re-litigate the 
issues raised in the suit or to seek relief with respect thereto 
additional to that given by the consent decrees. Aluminum 
Co. v. United States, 302 U.S. 230, 232 ... ; United States v. 
International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 703 .... This is 
a very real benefit of which they would be deprived were the 
Government's motion to be granted."33 
In the International Haroester case, cited by Judge Maris, the 
government had obtained a decision by a district court that the 
Reed (the nvo dissenters in the Chrysler case) were joined by Chief Justice Vinson and 
Justice Burton. Justices Murphy and Jackson took no part, and Justices Black, Douglas 
and Rutledge dissented. 
so Id. at 321. 
31 Id. at 322. 
32 United States v. R.C.A., (D.C. Del. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 654 at 656. An appeal by 
the United States was dismissed on its own motion [318 U.S. 796 (1943)]. 
33 Id. at 656. 
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defendant was a combination in restraint of trade.34 The district 
court's decree entered in 1914 required that defendant be divided 
into three companies. Subsequently, this decree was modified by 
consent and the provision for mandatory dissolution elimi-
nated.35 A further consent decree, entered after defendant had 
dismissed its appeal to the Supreme Court,36 was entered in 1918. 
The 1918 decree contained a clause providing that if "competi-
tive conditions . . . in harvesting machines . . . shall not have 
been established at the expiration of eighteen months after the 
termination of the existing war ... the United States shall have 
the right to such further relief herein as shall be necessary to re-
store said competitive conditions and to bring about a situation 
. h .th I "37 m armony w1 aw .... 
In 1923 the United States filed a supplemental petition to se-
cure additional relief.38 It argued that the purpose of the 1918 
decree was to restore competitive conditions as they obtained 
prior to the formation of the defendant in 1902 and that the de-
cree had not accomplished that purpose.30 On appeal from the 
district court's denial of the supplemental petition, the Supreme 
Court held that lawful "competitive conditions" had been es-
tablished, though not those existing in 1902, and that to grant 
further relief "would plainly be repugnant to the agreement ap-
proved by the court and embodied in the decree, which has be-
come binding upon all parties, and upon which the International 
Company has, in the exercise of good faith, been entitled to 
rely."40 
The government learned from the Harvester case that the 
privilege of having a try for a second bite is afforded only to those 
who expressly and plainly reserve that privilege. And even that 
reservation does not guarantee that the second bite will be very 
nourishing. The second-bite privilege is written into some con-
sent judgments in a provision that is popularly known as a "sword 
of Damocles" clause. The term. perhaps was first applied to the 
Flat Glass decree in 1948. That decree gives the United States at 
34 United States v. International Harvester Co., (D.C. Minn. 1914) 214 F. 987. 
35 See United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 at 696 (1927). 
36 International Harvester Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 587 (1918). 
37 Quoted in United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 at 697 (1927). 
38 See United States v. International Harvester Co., (D.C. Minn., undated) 10 F. (2d) 
827 at 828. 
39 See United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 at 702 (1927). 
40 Id. at 703. 
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any time after three years from the date of the judgment the 
privilege of filing a petition for dissolution of the principal de-
fendants "without showing a change in circumstance."41 Since 
Harvester, the government has never invoked this type of clause 
to obtain additional relief. 
The "precedent . . . of Damocles" was explicitly utilized by 
Judge Wyzanski in his judgment in United States v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp.42 In his "Opinion on Remedy" Judge Wyzanski 
frankly expressed his reluctance to proceed "with the surgical 
ruthlessness that might commend itself to those seeking abso-
lute assurance that there will be workable competition." He 
therefore proposed first to try "milder remedies." But he ruled 
that ten and a half years after termination of any appeal to the 
Supreme Court "both parties shall report to this Court the effect 
of this decree, and may then petition for its modification, in view 
of its effect in establishing workable competition. If either party 
takes advantage of this paragraph by filing a petition, each such 
petition shall be accompanied by affidavits setting forth the then 
structure of the shoe machinery market and defendant's power 
within that market."48 
Judge Wyzanski's "C Day" provisions evidence an apparent de-
sire . by the court for a thorough-going re-evaluation of the effect 
of the decree some twelve years after he filed his opinion. At that 
time either party may petition for its modification. For example, 
defendant could ask that the compulsory machinery-sale provi-
sions-the heart of the decree-be lifted. And the government 
could ask for more drastic relief such as for abolition of the leas-
ing system altogether. 
We must wait until 1965 or later to assay the wisdom of Judge 
Wyzanski's "C Day." We hazard the guess that much will depend 
upon whether the judge himself is then sitting in the District of 
Massachusetts. But surely "C Day" points in the right direction 
and suggests a principle which might well be adapted by the 
Antitrust Division for use in most, if not all, its consent judg-
ments. 
In two relatively recent litigated judgments entered in the 
Southern District of New York in important government anti-
41 United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., (N.D. Ohio 1948) CCH 1948-1949 
TRADE CAS. 1[62,323, Art. XXIX. 
42 (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 295 at 351, affd. per curiam 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
48 Arts. 1 and 18 (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 295 at 352 and 354. 
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trust cases, the government was given the privilege of petitioning 
for "additional" relief during a five-y<:;ar period following the 
entry of the judgment.44 In both cases at the expiration of the 
five-year period, the government, instead of asking for further 
relief, asked that the period in which it could apply for such re-
lief be extended. The sought-for extension was for five years in 
Alcoa and for two in the ICI case. The court in each case denied 
the government's petition.45 In denying the ICI extension, Judge 
Ryan concluded his opinion by saying, "An open end judgment 
would not aid competition, but rather tends to stifle it and pre-
vent research and development of new or improved products." 
In the Alcoa case, Judge Cashin held that the purpose of the 
five-year period "was to observe Kaiser's and Reynolds' progress, 
or lack of it." He found that during that period, Alcoa's relative 
share of the aluminum market had declined while Kaiser's had in-
creased and Reynolds' remained the same.46 He concluded: 
". . . Kaiser and Reynolds have not only thrived and prospered 
but they have removed all reasonable doubts as to their capacity 
to effectively compete with Alcoa in the future."47 
If the court in either of these two cases intended to permit 
the government to request it to reappraise the decrees in these 
two hard-fought cases, it would seem that Judge Wyzanski's 
"C Day" provision would have been a preferable formulation 
for achieving that result. The "C Day" provision contains two 
vital differences: the length of time for reappraisal is more than 
doubled to twelve years from the date of the court's formulation 
of the judgment and both sides are given the chance to petition 
for important modifications.48 
In consent decrees, provisions giving the government the right 
to further relief are likely to prove little more than empty threats. 
Consider the position of a court in a petition to modify a consent 
judgment where the petition seeks the drastic relief of divorce-
44 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at 
419; United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215. 
45 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 132; 
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1957) CCH 1957 Trade Cas. 
1[68,859. 
46 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 132 at 167. 
47 Id. at 171. 
48 In the ICI case, the judgment apparently did give both sides an opportunity to 
petition for changes in the decree, although the language giving the defendants this op-
portunity is no more explicit than that in the standard retention-of-jurisdiction clause. 
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ment or dissolution of a putative monopolist. There is no record 
to which the court can turn. One must be created for him as a 
result of hearings. The judge did not fashion the original decree. 
This was done by consent of the parties. His knowledge of it is 
confined, at most, to having had it explained to him at the time 
of its entry, just before he signed it. 
While a consent decree is not a private contract, as we have 
learned above, it is a settlement of litigation and as such has 
some of the attributes of accord and satisfaction. Courts are apt 
to be extremely reluctant, no matter how explicit is the privilege 
of either party to reopen, to grant additional relief to the govern-
ment. · 
For much the same reason, provisions analogous to Judge 
Wyzanski's "C Day" are not apt to prove effective in consent de-
crees. If either party moves for modification, it is likely that the 
other party will counter with a petition for modification_ in the 
opposite direction. In this circumstance a court is likely to deny 
both. 
The government is not altogether helpless if its demands for 
further relief are not met. It is usually open to it to institute a 
new civil case alleging that defendant is presently violating the 
Sherman Act. And in fact on several occasions the government 
has filed new suits against defendants already subject to extensive 
restrictions in consent decrees covering practices in the same 
markets as those involved in the first suits.49 In the second case, 
however, the government may be prevented from introducing 
evidence of events occurring prior to the entry of the first judg-
ment.150 And in at least one such instance the attorney general has 
stated that this prevented the government from successfully 
prosecuting the second case. Curiously enough, this occurred in 
49 302 U.S. 230 (1937); United States v. General Electric Co., CCH, THE FEDERAL 
ANTITRusr LAws, p. 86, #82 and p. 240, #575 (1952); United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, id. at 96, #116, and 175, #423; United States v. Central-West Publishing Co., 
id. at 97, #119, and 420, #1105 (sub nom. United States v. Western Newspaper Union); 
United States v. Swift & Co., id. at 118, #211 (sub nom. United States v. Armour and 
Co.) and 374, #944; United States v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., id. at 152, #346, 
and 406, #1058; United States v. Radio Corp. of America, id. at 158, #371, and 147, 
#1210 (1952-1956 Supp.); United States v. Textile Refinishers Assn., id. at 172, #414, and 
420, #1106; United States v. Borden Co., id. at 233, #556, and 415, #1090; United States 
v. American Society of Composers, id. at 247, #593, and 355, #896. 
50 Orders (unreported) to this effect were entered in the second cases against Armour 
& Co., General Outdoor Advertising Co., and Borden Co., cited in the preceding note. 
All of these cases arose in the Northern District of Illinois. 
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the meat industry. In 1948-sixteen years after defendants lost 
in their effort to modify the 1920 decree-the government filed a 
second broad equity suit against the American Meat Institute 
and four of the five defendants in the 1920 case, alleging mo-
nopolization in meat extending back to 1905.51 On defendants' 
motion, the district court entered an order preventing the govern-
ment from introducing any testimony as to matters occurring 
prior to April 2, 1930, the date on which Armour and Swift had 
filed their amended petitions to modify the 1920 decree.52 On the 
eve of trial in 1954, the government dismissed the 1948 complaint 
on the ground that order limiting proof made it impossible for 
the government to proceed to try the case.53 
In the case of RCA, the government filed a second suit in 
1954 which is pending.54 The complaint carefully limits the alle-
gations of illegal activities to a time subsequent to the filing of the 
first consent decree. The matter first reached the courts as a re-
sult of a grand jury investigation instituted in 1952, ten years 
after Judge Maris denied the government's petition to vacate the 
1932 consent decree. When subpoenaed to produce its records 
before the grand jury, RCA pleaded the consent decree as a bar 
to the subpoena.55 Judge Weinfeld refused to quash it and held 
that the consent decree did not bar subsequent grand jury inves-
tigation. The subpoena, however, called for no records dated 
earlier than 1934, somewhat more than a year after the entry of 
the consent decree. 
The principal benefit which a defendant obtains from a con-
sent decree is, of course, that the litigation is ended. As Judge 
Maris put it in the RCA case, defendant may set up the decree "as 
a bar to any attempt by the Government to relitigate the issues 
raised in the suit" or to seek additional relief.56 Suppose a defend-
ant's conduct fifteen or twenty years after the entry of a decree has 
neither violated the decree nor the antitrust laws, and suppose 
51 See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, p. 374, #944 (1952). 
52 See p. 52 of Brief cited in note 14 supra. 
53 Id., Exhibit Y. (Press release, Dept. of Justice, dated March 17, 1954). In 1956 
defendants Swift, Armour and Cudahy filed new motions to modify the 1920 consent 
decree. They also moved to transfer the case from the District of Columbia to the 
Northern District of Illinois. The motion has been granted. United States v. Swift and 
Co., (D.C. D.C. 1958) 158 F. Supp. 551. 
54 See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws-1952-1956 Supp., p. 147, #1210 (1957). 
55Application of Radio Corporation of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 13 F.R.D. 167. 
56 Quoted at note 33 supra. 
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further that the decree no longer serves any useful purpose. In 
the existing state of the law, it is extremely doubtful if either side 
could vacate it if the other side objected. 
This problem is doubtless not serious when related to the ma-
jority of antitrust consent judgments. Most of them lose "practi-
cal significance with the passage of ... time."57 But consent de-
crees rendered in important monopoly cases [National Cash Reg-
ister (1916); 58 International Harvester (1918);59 the Meat Packers 
(1920);60 R.C.A. (1932);61 Ford62 and Chrysler (1938); 68 Libbey-
Owens-Ford (1948); 04 Eastman Kodak (1954);65 International 
Business Machines (1956)66-to cite some leading examples] con-
tinue to hang over the defendants and the public with no real re-
examination as the years go by to determine their present effec-
tiveness or their appropriateness. 
Forty years ago it seemed proper and wise to limit the Har-
vester Company to only one dealer in agricultural implements in 
any one city.67 This may or may not be a wise restraint today. 
Thirty-eight years ago, it was thought in the public interest to 
prevent Cudahy Packing Company from selling meats and gro-
ceries at retail.68 Is this wise in today's market place? Yet, in the 
absence of a showing of grievous wrong resulting from changing 
circumstances these provisions will continue, apparently forever. 
A consent judgment that has already been in effect for fifteen 
or twenty years whose injunctions are still necessary has probably 
been ineffective. Within that period the judgment should have ac-
complished its objectives. At the conclusion of tµat period both 
the government and the defendants should reassess the competi-
tive situation in the market or markets involved, and unless the 
conclusions are clear both that an injunction is still necessary to 
compel obedience to law and maintain competition and that the 
judgment has and will continue to serve that purpose, the judg-
57 See Tobin v. Alma Mills, (4th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 133 at 136. 
58 See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, p. 91, #100 (1952). 
59 See text at note 34 supra. 
60 See text at note 16 supra. 
61 See text at note 32 supra. 
62 See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, p. 187, #439 (1952). 
68 Id. at 186, #438. 
64 See text at note 41 supra. 
65 CCH 1954 TRADE CAs. 1[67,920. 
66 CCH 1956 TRADE CAs. 1[68,245. 
67 See pp. 1058-1059 supra. 
68 See p. 1054 supra. 
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ment should be terminated. Thus, there should be inserted in all 
antitrust consent decrees a paragraph along the following lines: 
"Fifteen [ or twenty] years after the entry of this final judg-
ment all of its provisions then in effect shall automatically 
terminate against all defendants unless any party to the judg-
ment shall have filed, within three months before the ex-
piration of said fifteen [ or twenty] year period, a petition to 
continue in force any or all of said provisions. Said petition 
shall state the reasons why it is deemed equitable and in the 
public interest that said provisions, or any of them, be con-
tinued. Within sixty days after any such petition shall have 
been filed each other party to the judgment shall file an an-
swer thereto. After the filing of said answers, this court shall 
hold a hearing at which any party may offer testimony and 
other evidence on the merits of said petition or petitions. 
Pending decision on said petition or petitions the provisions 
in this final judgment sought to be continued by each such 
petition shall continue in effect." 
This suggested provision might not be sufficient to permit the 
government, after a decree has been terminated pursuant to its 
terms, successfully to attack the legality in any subsequent suit 
against the same defendants of their activities. prior to the entry 
of the first decree.69 To insure that allegations of this type in new 
suits against the same defendants would withstand defenses based 
on a theory of estoppel, the proposed new paragraph might also 
authorize dismissal of the first complaint if and when the judg-
ment is terminated. In addition, the new paragraph should pro-
vide that the first judgment shall not bar granting appropriate 
relief in any new case that may be filed by the government.70 
Thus, an additional sentence could be added along the following 
lines: 
69 Cf. United States v. RCA, (D.C. Del. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 654, discussed in text 
at note 32 supra; and cases cited note 41 supra. But cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. 
of America, (W.D. Pa. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 608, affd. 302 U.S. 230 (1937). 
70 A provision along these lines is contained in art. IX of the consent judgment in 
United States v. International Nickel Co. of Canada,. Ltd., (S.D. N.Y. 1948) CCH 1948-1949 
TRADE CAS. 1[62,280. 
Section XIII of the Consent Judgment in the United Fruit case provides that twenty 
years after defendant "has completed performance of the plan for disposition of assets 
described in Article VIII," the judgment "shall thereafter be of no force or effect." 
United States v. United Fruit Co., (E.D. La. 1958) 1958 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1[68,941. 
Since art. VIII, §E, gives the defendant a period of not more than four years after June 
30, 1966 to comply with a suitable divestiture plan, the 20-year period might not com-
mence until 1970. 
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"If this court determines that this final judgment shall be 
terminated, it shall ( or may) also enter an order dismissing 
the complaint herein, without prejudice, in which event, in 
any new proceeding instituted by the plaintiff under the 
Sherman Act after the entry of any such order of dismissal, 
this judgment shall not be deemed a bar to the granting of 
appropriate relief or the interposition of any defense other 
than that such relief is barred by this judgment." 
If dismissal of the original complaint is left to the discretion 
of the court, rather than made mandatory, there is good reason 
to suppose that the entire paragraph would be acceptable to 
many defendants for inclusion in consent decrees hereafter en-
tered. The proposal should also have appeal for the Antitrust 
Division. In drafting and negotiating consent decrees, the Anti-
trust Division is not in the position solely of a litigant in a law 
suit; rather it must necessarily assume many of the attributes of 
an administrative tribunal. In many cases, while occupying this 
role, the division is purporting to draft what will become an in-
dustry code of lawful competition. As such it necessarily has a 
greater responsibility than if it were proposing a final judgment 
for consideration by an impartial court after a full trial. Indeed, 
in negotiating consent decrees the division must perforce assume 
-if only for the moment-a kind of judicial role. 
Viewed in this light, the Antitrust Division, as well as de-
fendants and the public, should gain by agreeing upon automatic 
termination of consent judgments after they have been in effect 
for a long period of years unless there is some clear reason in a 
particular case for continuing any of their provisions. 
